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ARTICLES
CASELOAD EXPLOSION: THE
APPELLATE RE SPONSE
RICHARD HENRY MILLS*

[Omit from the reports all] cases wherein there is solemnly and
long debated matter whereof there is now no question at all and
cases merely of iteration and repetition.
-Sir Francis Bacon,
Lord Chancellor of England
to King James I.**
The concern of Viscount St. Albans (Bacon's peerage title)
has been shared by many in our profession over these three centuries. On the contemporary appellate scene, the bar and bench
are cogently aware of the immense amount of material that has
been published concerning the caseload explosion. Legions of
administrative reports, law review articles, and formal addresses before legal gatherings have underscored the virtual avalanche of appeals that has inundated reviewing courts in both
the state and federal systems.' In his "State of the Judiciary"
address for the year 1980, the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he federal appellate courts have
Justice, Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, since 1976;
LL.M., University of Virginia; J.D., Mercer University (Mercer Law Review);
B.A., Illinois College. Admitted in Illinois, 1957; State's Attorney of Cass
County, Illinois, 1960-64; Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit of Illinois, 1966-76.
Member, Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee, 1963-present; Commissioner, Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, 1977-present; Colonel, JAGC,
USAR.
** F. Whitehair, Opinions of Courts. Fifth Circuit Acts Against Unneeded Publication,33 A.B.A.J. 755, 844 (1947).
1. Legal commentators have written graphically of this "explosion of

lawsuits." See, e.g., Marcus, JudicialOverload: The Reasons and the Remedies, 28 BUFFALo L. REV. 111 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Marcus]. The contributing causes to the caseload explosion and backlog are myriad but one
judge believes there are five primary factors: (1) the need to resolve
problems; (2) governmental social policies and regulations that have grown
more numerous and complex; (3) the difference between the market rate of
interest and the legal rate of interest which encourages delay in the payment of judgments, often manifested by the taking of an appeal; (4) "devotion to the billable hour concept" which has encouraged delays and
increased the costs of major litigation; and (5) the failure of many courts to
enforce proper levels of lawyer performance. Nelson, Why Are Things Being
Done This Way?, 19 JUDGES' J. 13, 15 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Nelson].
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increased their filings over the last year by 15%," and that the
current appellate caseload "is 100% over the appellate caseload
'2
of just ten years ago."
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court's caseload increased from approximately 400 cases in 1900 to 4,000 in 1980-a
1000% increase in 80 years. 3 In 1950, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit had a backlog of 250 cases waiting to be heard. In
1960, the figure was 400, in 1970, it was 500, and in 1980, it was
4
4,500.
State appellate court caseloads for the past 20 years have
5
been increasing at the staggering rate of at least 11% annually.
Reports and studies from the National Center for State Courts
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts reflect
a massive upsurge in appeals in both state and federal reviewing
courts. The caseload since 1960 in the federal circuit courts of
appeals increased 418.6%, while caseloads in state courts of last
resort increased from a low of 132% (Kentucky) to a high of
560% (Nevada). Equal or greater increases were reflected in
statistics for the intermediate appellate courts of the various
states. For the period 1960-1975, the number of cases in California courts of appeal increased 367%, New Jersey's appellate division caseload increased 439%, and the New York appellate
divisions' caseload increased 330%.6
2. Burger, State of the Judiciary Address (1981).
3. McLaughlan, An Exploratory Analysis of the Supreme Court's

Caseloadfrom 1880-1976, 64 JUDICATURE 33 (1980). Between 1951 and 1971,
the number of new cases filed in the United States Supreme Court jumped

from 1,200 to 3,600. In 70 years (1902-1972) the total number of cases filed in
federal district courts rose nearly 500%, and in the single year 1974-75, the
district court caseload increased by 11.7%. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 113.
4. Nelson, supra note 1, at 13. In his 1982 State of the Judiciary Address, Chief Justice Burger said that "federal case filings continued to
mount," with court of appeals filings having increased by nearly 14%. He
stated that statistical projections indicate that "Court of Appeals case
filings will rise between the judicial years 1975 and 1983 by 80 percent." Bur-

ger, State of the Judiciary Address (1982).
5. Flango & Blair, Creating An Intermediate Appellate Court: Does It
Reduce the Caseload of a State's Highest Court?, 64 JUDICATURE 75 (1980)

[hereinafter cited as Flango &Blair].
6. 1979 Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Table 1, at 3; Wasey, Marvell & Aikman, VOLUME AND
DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE COURTS: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSEs, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (1979).

'"There seems to be rather general agreement among lawyers who follow the work of the [Minnesota Supreme] Court that the caseload battle
has recently reached a crisis stage." Wolfram, Notes from a Study of the

Caseload of the Minnesota Supreme Court: Some Comments and Statistics
on Pressures and Responses, 53 MINN. L. REV. 939, 941 (1969) [hereinafter

cited as Wolfram]. Statistics in Hawaii indicate that enough appeals are
filed in a single year in the Supreme Court of Hawaii to occupy that court
for two years. Levinson, Appellate Caseload in Hawaii, 13 HAwAII B.J. 3
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THE NEED FOR STATE APPELLATE COURTS

United States Circuit Judge Frank M. Coffin has written
that "[tjhe appellate tradition dates back some 4000 to 6000
years to several highly developed civilizations in that fecund
area of the world we call the Near East."'7 Until 1958, however,8
only 13 states had established intermediate appellate courts.
As the caseloads of various state courts of last resort became
more intolerable, those states without intermediate reviewing
courts began looking long and hard at this alternative. As one
high court jurist phrased it: "I have personally concluded that
creation of an intermediate appellate court is the alternative
most likely to meet the Court's increased caseload problem as
well as insure that the law-stating function of the Court is not
diluted."9 Another state chief justice pointed out that "[tJrial
courts cannot be created and litigation at the trial level multiplied without a corresponding effect in increased work on the
appellate level."'10 He, too, recommended an appellate court for
the State of Wisconsin, and that recommendation became a
reality.
Commentators generally agree that the best means available for clearing appellate congestion-while still preserving the
cardinal role of the highest court-is the creation of an intermediate court of appeals. The proper relationship of a court of appeals to a supreme court in a two-tier system of appellate review
has been rather saliently described as follows: "The intermediate appellate court is assigned the function of correcting mis(1977). In Virginia, one study showed that over a period of ten years the

percentage increase in cases reaching the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was nearly six times as large as the percentage increase in cases concluded by the trial courts (232% compared with 41%). Lilly & Scalia,
Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?,57 VA. L. REV. 3, 6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Lilly & Scalia]. The number of cases docketed in the Supreme
Court of Iowa more than doubled over a ten year period. Stuart, Iowa
Supreme Court Congestion: Can We Avert a Crisis?,55 IowA L. REV. 594, 596
(1970). In California, a special state bar committee on appellate courts concluded: "If we continue the present system without appreciable changes, it
will be hopelessly mired down in its own workload, or must be expanded to
such huge size that it will be unworkable." Leavitt, The Yearly Two Foot
Shelf Suggestionsfor ChangingOur Reviewing Court Procedures,4 PAC. L.
J. 1, 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Leavitt].
7. F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 17 (1980).
8. Flango & Blair, supra note 5, at 77.
9. Richardson, Remarks on Alternative Proposalsto Remedy Appellate
Court Congestion in Hawaii, 14 HAwAii B.J. 56 (1978). One of the members

of the highest court of Idaho has proposed that "[a] n intermediate court of
appeals [could] clear Idaho's congested dockets." Donaldson, A Crisis in
the Idaho Court System: An "Appealing" Remedy, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 5
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Donaldson].
10. Hallows, The Casefor an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 Wis. B.
BULL. 15, 16 (1971).
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takes . . 'whereas the highest court is assigned as its primary
function the obligation of law development, of resolving conflicts
among lower courts, of teaching the other courts and lawyers
and public about the law.' "" In the last 20 years, a surprisingly
sizeable number of states have responded to logic and the pressure of increasing caseload volume. Today, a total of 32 states
12
have established intermediate appellate courts.
GRAPPLING WITH WAYS TO EXPEDITE

Despite the increased caseload, the intermediate appellate
courts must get about the business at hand: resolving disputed
actions of trial courts. And they must do it faster than they have
in the past. 13 The business-as-usual approach cannot keep pace.
The "old way" simply must be replaced or supplemented by new
means and procedures. Let us, then, examine some of the more
11. Labbe, The Case Against a Separate Court of CriminalAppeals, 27
LA. B.J. 93 (1979). This was the very concept that the American Bar Associ-

ation Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration had in mind
when it drafted these comments:
Where a Supreme Court by reason of workload is unable to perform
both of its principal functions, some additional mechanism of appellate
review becomes necessary. This situation has long since prevailed in
states with large population, and is becoming increasingly prevalent in
states of smaller population. The immediate necessity for an intermediate appellate court may be met or postponed by such devices as use
of per curiam and memorandum decisions in cases having limited general significance, by limiting oral argument in appropriate circumstances, and by improved efficiency in management of the highest
appellate court's work. On the other hand, such expedience as dividing
the highest appellate court into panels, using commissioners to hear
cases, or eliminating oral argument dilute the appellate function, particularly that of developing the law. Adding additional judges to a highest
court may actually slow down its operation rather than speeding [sic] it
up. Hence, when improvement in efficiency of operation in the highest
court cannot be achieved without dilution of the appellate function, the
appropriate solution is the creation of an intermediate appellate court.
Since there seems little prospect for a long run decline in the volume of
appellate litigation, once the surge of appellate cases has been felt in a
state having only one appellate court, steps should be taken forthwith
to establish an intermediate appellate court rather than temporizing
with substitute arrangements.
A. B. A. COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.13 (1974) (commentary). See also Donaldson, supra note 9, at 5.
12. Osthus & Stiegler, State IntermediateAppellate Courts, June AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Osthus & Stiegler]. Intermediate appellate courts exist in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,. Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
13. For a comprehensive study and analysis of endemic delay in the
state appellate process, see generally MARTIN & PRESCOTr, APPELLATE
COURT DELAY, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS

(1981).
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logical and successful variations in appellate practice around
the country.
Judges First
Delay problems in appellate courts are primarily the judges'
responsibility. Although the blame is frequently placed elsewhere, judges have the authority and the means to reduce excessive delays in the disposition of cases. 14 Appellate judges
possess the authority to enforce time limits against attorneys
who do not comply with the rules. Thus, the amount of delay is
in direct proportion to what the judges of a particular court will
tolerate.
Initially, the members of a particular court must recognize
their responsibility for reducing delay. They must then adopt
one of the procedures available to carry out that obligationwhether it be case management techniques, rule amendments,
shortening time deadlines for filing, eliminating or shortening
oral arguments, writing fewer opinions for publication, producing more memorandum and per curiam opinions, or ruling from
the bench. As the National Center for State Courts has put it:
"By and large, all a delay reduction effort needs is a decision by
the judges to conduct it and a decision about which elements of
5
the decision-making procedure can be curtailed."'
Two-Judge Panels
As long as there is an explosion in litigation, an increase in
appeals is going to follow as the night does the day. Simply
adding more judges to the mix can not increase judicial efficiency. "[I]ncreasing the number of judges as a tool for judicial
6
reform is a finite palliative."'
In 1978, the New Jersey Supreme Court's committee on the
appellate division closely examined the caseload explosion
problem. Its "pivotal recommendation" was that dispositions in
appropriate appellate cases be made by two-judge panels. The
key would be to screen pending appeals for cases that are "uncomplicated, clear-cut, non-controversial and relatively unimportant to the public" at large.' 7 This proposal was duly adopted
14. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITrEE ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
COURTS § 3.52 (Approved Draft 1977) (standards of timely disposition).
15. Marvell, Appellate Court Delay Reduction. Judges First, III APPELLATE COURT ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 28, 30 (1980-81).

16. Handler, Justice at the Intermediate Appellate Level:
Jersey Appellate Division, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 58, 62 (1979).

17. Id. at 65.

The New
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by the New Jersey Supreme Court and incorporated in its
rules. 18 Subsequent statistics from New Jersey indicate that
there is no necessity for appellate cases to be heard by three
judges. In the 1978-79 term of the appellate division, 74% of the
cases were designated as two-judge appeals, and 26% were reserved for three-judge panels. It is noteworthy that the appellate division disposed of almost 2,400 more cases than it did the
year before, and more than two-thirds of them were two-judge
dispositions. 19
Commissioners
In the last part of the 19th century, 19 states established
Court Commissioners primarily to reduce overcrowded appellate dockets. New York, in 1869, provided for five commissioners, appointed by the governor, who sat as a separate court of
appeals panel. Their opinions had the full force of a court of appeals decision, and in two years the appellate backlog was overcome. The system then lapsed into disuse. Ohio, in 1875,
created a similar commission of five commissioners, and that
custom existed until 1879. Indiana and Texas followed suit in
1881, Ohio and Missouri in 1883, California in 1885, Colorado and
Kansas in 1887.20
The function of an appellate court commission has been described as:
A careful and impartial collation of the facts and points in a
case, with references to the transcript for the verification thereof,
made by men skilled in that service, and entirely unbiased and uninterested in the cause, accompanied by an expression of opinion
as to the law and reference to the authorities to sustain it, as well as
a reference
to the authorities claimed to be adverse to such
21
opinion.
Appellate court commissions were used in two ways. In the
first, commissioners sat with the court, had no vote, and were
then assigned to draft opinions. These dispositions were submitted to the judges and, when ultimately released, were the
opinions of the court. In the second method, three or more commissioners would sit as a separate panel, hear cases, draft opin18. Id.
19. Id. at 75-76.
20. The Office of Commissioner of the Michigan Court of Appeals and Its

Role in the Appellate Process, 48 F. R. D. 355, 356 (1969).
21. Id., quoting People ex rel Morgan v. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111, 23 P. 1, 5
(1890).
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ions, and submit them to the full court for approval or
22
rejection.
It has been said that the function of the commissioner may
vary considerably in different jurisdictions. For instance, in
Michigan, a commissioner's role is primarily to recommend action on discretionary matters such as the granting or denial of
applications for leave to appeal. These recommendations contain a full statement of the facts and law involved, are circulated
among all of the members of the court, and if there is any disa3
greement, the matter is referred to the entire court.2 But in
Missouri, we find the opposite extreme; commissioners hear arguments and write opinions in cases before the court, although
that
their dispositions are technically only recommendations
24
must be approved by the Missouri Supreme Court.
There are a number of functions on a reviewing court that
lie between routine matters that either the clerk of the court or
law clerks can attend to, and those that demand the personal
attention of at least one of the members of the court. These are
matters, of course, which may be performed by commissioners,
such as reviewing applications for original writs, petitions for
leave to appeal, or certiorari. The commissioners may also be
used to perform functions that can readily be reviewed by the
court. Just as it is not uncommon in many courts for an initial
working draft of a disposition to be prepared by a law clerk, a
commissioner can function in much the same way. As long as
the holding of the disposition and the legal reasons ascribed
thereto are duly received, passed upon, and adopted by the
court, there is no risk of defacto delegation of judicial authority.
The submitted disposition is readily reviewable by a justice or a
of but a fraction of the time expended
panel at the expenditure
25
by the commissioner.
It has been suggested that the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals:
might consider the use of the commissioner to write certain opinions. When a particular disposition and the reasons for it have
been decided upon in conference, it would not appear to be necessary in every instance that one of the justices devote himself to the
literary effort of couching the opinion in the appeltime-consumnng
2s
late language.
22. 48 F. R. D. at 356-57. Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota and Texas
have used the former method. California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma and Texas have used the latter system
at various times. Id.
23. Id.
24. Lilly & Scalia, supra note 6, at 29.
25. Id. at 32-33.
26. Id.
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A variation of the commissioner system can be found in Minnesota where a state statute provides for the appointment by the
Minnesota Supreme Court of one of its retired members as a
commissioner "to aid and assist in the performance of such of its
' 27
duties as may be assigned to him with his consent.
Central Staff
The paramount work priority of an appellate judge is, of
course, to make decisions-to decide cases. The manner in
which those decisions are communicated is of secondary priority. This is particularly true where crushing caseloads are prevalent. The in-chamber mechanics of articulating a dispositionwhether by full-blown opinion, short memorandum, or one-line
order-are those time-consuming matters that demand assistance. It is a universal acknowledgement "that judges, like other
professionals in short supply and heavy demand, must spend
their productive hours free of the menial work which is properly
'28
assignable to their assistants.
It would seem axiomatic that a judge should be able to turn
to someone on his staff to research a point inadequately covered
by the parties, check a report of proceedings to find testimony
on a given point, perform research on a key issue, or provide the
judge with a working draft of a disposition based on a cardinal
point raised on appeal.
If our reviewing court judges are to do the job we expect of themmaintaining quality with ever-increasing caseloads-we must
strengthen their professional staffs and encourage the delegation of
nondecisional work. Of a future Solomon, it might admiringly be
said, "none of the losers like his decisions, but they
29 all agreed his
facts were accurate. What a staff he must have."
The primary responsibility of a law clerk is to act as the
right arm of the judge, and a close working relationship is the
day-to-day norm. But the central staff attorney is actually a law
clerk at large to the court as a whole. Professor Meador has defined a central staff attorney in this way:
[A] staff attorney is a legally trained person working for and assisting an appellate court as a whole. Various titles are used: research
attorney, commissioner, pro se clerk, staff law clerk, and pool aide.
If such persons in fact provide professional assistance for the court
as an entity, they are staff attorneys, as that term is used in this
report. A law clerk and staff attorney are both lawyers providing
professional legal help to appellate judges in the decision of cases.
27. MINN.STAT. § 490.025, subd. 5 (1967), quoted in Wolfram, supra note
6, at 963 n. 12.
28. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 16.
29. Id. at 17.
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But the former works exclusively for a single judge in whatever
way the judge wishes to use him; the job is highly personal. The
latter has no special relationship to any individual judge but rather
works for the court or a panel within it as a collective unit; the staff
responsibility is institutional. This is30a key distinction in understanding the roles of the central staff.
Chief Justice Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court
wrote: "[f]inding that increasing the number of law clerks per
judge does not result in a corresponding increase in efficiency,
appellate courts have turned recently to the central staff as a
method of increasing the court's productivity. ' 31 He correctly
points out that: "the central staff is more important in preparing
the information that will be considered by the court in reaching
a decision, while the law clerk is more important in justifying
'32
that decision after it is made.
Central staff can be used in numerous ways and its functions may be quite varied. For instance, time saving steps can
be made in the areas of "screening," preparation of predecision
memoranda for the court's guidance, preparation of memos in
motion practice, and opinion drafting in frivolous appeals, unpublished memorandum decisions, and even portions of major
published opinions upon occasion. As Professor Meador has
noted:
Appellate courts which have established central staffs have used
the staff attorneys largely for research and preparation of memoranda on appeals which have been completely briefed. Staff memoranda are often prepared in such a way that with small changes the
judges can convert them into33per curiam opinions if they deem
such dispositions appropriate.
30. D.

MEADOR, APPELLATE COURT: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF

VOLUME 17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CRISIS OF VOLUME).

The duties of staff attorneys should be defined in institutional terms. In
contrast, the duties of a law clerk are defined by the personal desires of
the judge for whom he works ....

Thus with proper organization the

positions of law clerk and staff attorney do not overlap. They are not
mutually exclusive; they are complementary. A busy appellate court
needs both.
Id. See also Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional
Processes,61 VA. L. REV. 255, 264 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Appellate Case
Management].
31. Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 23
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 465, 468 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cameron].
32. Id. at 469.
33. Appellate Case Management, supra note 30, at 266.
A staff memorandum can assist the court in several ways. It enables a
judge to get a quick profile of the appeal; it accelerates his understanding of the essential features of the case. He can then dig into the record
and briefs to whatever extent he thinks desirable on selected points.
The net effect is to expedite the mental operations involved in assimilating key information and reaching a conclusion on the issues
presented. In short, the memorandum contributes to reducing the
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Screening
"Screening," in the classic sense of Professor Meador's definition, is the "process which occurs in an appellate court, prior
to any attempt to decide the merits of an appeal, whereby a tentative decision is made as to the decisional process through
which the case will thereafter proceed to disposition. '3 4 It is a
procedural method whereby each case is briefly examined, prior
to its being considered by all the judges of the decisional panel,
for the purpose of routing it through one of two or more different
types of decisional processes. It is only through screening that
the concept of differentiated case management is significantly
applied. The screening must take place early in the appellate
process if there is to be an identification of cases that will be
treated differently, and it can be done either by a judge or a legal
professional on the court's staff.
Meador urges that
[i]f screening is to be assigned to a staff attorney it should be the
responsibility of a single member of the staff. This makes it more
likely that the screening criteria will be applied uniformly and that
a higher degree of consistency will be attained. The staff director is
typically the staff member who does the screening. This is desirable because it permits him to maintain an overview of the total flow
of cases and to control the routing of cases to the staff for which he
is responsible ....

Since screening tentatively dispatches a case

along a particular decisional path, it is important that the judges
themselves
control the policies which govern this initial routing
35
action.
Appellate screening, in its contemporary concept, gained
prominence from a procedure begun in the Fifth Circuit in 1968.
Every appeal was screened initially by a judge, with every judge
of the court participating and sharing the burden. Judge Griffin
Bell explained that the system was grounded on the premise
that frivolous and unsubstantial appeals exist on any reviewing
court's calendar and oral argument is unnecessary in most of
judge's decisional time .... The memorandum [also] serves as a safeguard against judicial oversight or misunderstanding. It furnishes the
judges with a thorough scrutiny of the facts and the law by a disinterested attorney who shares the court's vantage point. It may also mitigate the consequences of deficient advocacy, since staff attorneys can
take note of significant errors not mentioned in the briefs and can undertake research beyond that revealed in the briefs. The memorandum
can thus reinforce the justice and soundness of appellate decisions.
Id. at 267-68.
34. CRISIS OF VOLuME, supra note 30, at 31.
35. Appellate Case Management, supra note 30, at 271. "When the California Court of Appeal, First District, created a central staff in 1970 to prepare memoranda and draft per curiam opinions, the court assigned the
screening function to the staff director under criteria fixed by the judges."
Id. at 270.
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those cases, while in others, only limited argument should be
permitted. The chief judge appoints panels of the court to review pending cases for assignment or disposition. The panel
may then, sua sponte or by suggestion of a party, conclude that a
case does not justify oral argument and place it on a "summary
calendar." Parties or their counsel are so notified. Under this
screening procedure, cases are classified by four categories:
frivolous cases, cases of substance but where oral argument is
unnecessary, cases for which limited argument is indicated, and
cases for argument. If the panel determines that a case is either
frivolous or does not warrant oral argument, such a case goes on
the summary calendar for disposition without oral argument
and a summary opinion is prepared and issued if there is no dissent. Three safeguards have been built into this system: (1) the
transfer to the summary calendar is a judicial determination;
(2) such transfer is only accomplished if the panel is unanimously of that view; and (3) the summary opinion must be
unanimous. The experience of the federal Fifth Circuit would
indicate that the screening process has been a very useful tool
for a busy court in need of maximum efficiency. Summary opinions have accounted for over one-third of that court's dispositions and increased the productivity of all of its judges in a
36
substantial way.
Justice McCormick of the Supreme Court of Iowa has suggested that screening begin with the docketing of the appeal.
Under this model, the appellant's docketing statement is reviewed by a screening panel of judges. One calendar would deal
with cases requiring full briefing and arguments, another would
list cases for limited argument and reduced briefing time. A
third calendar would encompass those cases to be submitted to
a special three-judge panel "which, on the basis of memoranda
prepared by the parties and staff, either assigns a case for full
decides the merits of the
briefing or, by unanimous agreement,
'37
briefing.
further
without
case
The screening by central staff in Arizona normally
notes lack of jurisdiction,. . . recommends which cases should be
treated by memoranda decisions that remain unpublished and
have no precedential value, suggests the amount of time which
should be allotted to oral argument, and notes other cases of a similar nature pending in [that] court or the court of appeals. By this
process the staff... is able to point out other actions in the Ari36. Bell, Toward a More Efficient FederalAppeals System, 54

JUDICA-

237, 239-43 (1971). Both the Sixth and Tenth Circuits also have screening procedures with certain variations.

TURE

37. McCormick, Appellate Congestion in Iowa:"Dimensions and Remedies, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 133, 154 (1975).
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zona Supreme Court or the court of appeals involving the same
point of law or the same party in a related matter. This allows us to
consider more than one case at the same time, and we will .frequently group the matters and assign them to one judge, achieving
no concomitant
a considerable saving of judicial manpower with
38
sacrifice in the quality of the judicial product.
Accelerated Docket
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in May 1978, initiated an accelerated docket plan for civil cases, and since then about 44% of
all civil actions have been handled under this procedure. 39 Each
lawyer must file preliminary statements within 30 days after the
notice of appeal is filed with the court, and from these the court
decides whether the issues can be resolved without a transcript,
by the use of only a portion of a transcript, or from an agreed
statement of facts. A case may be selected for the accelerated
docket from these categories and a shortened briefing schedule
is ordered. The appellant is usually given a 15-day period to file
an opening brief and the appellee a similar time to file an answering brief. If the appellant desires to file a reply brief, a
shortened time is allowed. Briefs are limited to a maximum of
20 pages, and if requested by either counsel, oral arguments are
limited to 15 minutes per side. 40 During the first year of this
experiment, the Colorado intermediate reviewing court was able
to dispose of most of these cases by written opinion within six
months of filing, and in many cases, within four months. The
possibility of including criminal cases is being explored, as well
41
as appeals from actions of governmental agencies.
Pre-Argument Conferences
Another appellate tool is the pre-argument conference,
which may take several forms. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
in 1976, introduced mandatory prehearing conferences to decrease the caseload. 42 This was not a new idea, of course, since
federal trial courts have used pretrial conferences under Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since 1938. Although this
type of conference has been used by state trial courts for many
years, its use in appellate courts is much more recent. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 1974, became the first
38. Cameron, supra note 31, at 470-71.
JUDGES' J. 33, 33-34 (1981).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court Prehearing Conference-An
Empirical Evaluation, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (1979).

39. Pierce, Appellate Reform in Colorado, 20
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federal appellate court to experiment in this area. 43
In essence, the Minnesota system involves the following
procedure. A prehearing statement is served along with the notice of appeal. The respondent then files a return statement; any
trial briefs or other documents relative to the issues raised on
appeal are also required to be filed. Attorneys are required to
come to the conference with full authority to settle and in some
cases, clients themselves are required to attend the conference.
The conference is conducted by either a member of the court or
an officer appointed by the court; matters discussed at the conference are held in strictest confidence, and if a justice of the
court conducted the conference, he is excluded from later consideration of the case on its merits. Although the primary focus
is on a voluntary settlement solution, limitation and clarification
of issues are also considered.4
The overriding purpose of the prehearing conference, of
course, is to encourage parties to resolve their disputes before
submission on the merits, and thus reduce litigation. In the first
year that this procedure was used in Minnesota, the judges enjoyed an average of 30.1% settlement of all the cases they
45
preconferenced.
In writing upon appellate procedures, U. S. Circuit Judge
Leventhal pointed out that pre-argument conferences are used
primarily
in cases which are amenable to settlement-appeals involving personal injuries, property damage, employment, or contract disputes-where the cost of monetary awards and of continued
litigation are readily calculable. Cases seeking injunctive relief or
raising substantial questions of administrative law are generally
deemed unsuited for pre-argument conferences ....
There are,
however, possible reforms in pre-argument procedure that may
help to clarify issues and consolidate the record. If the matters involved are relatively ministerial, though important, a staff assistant
may seek to affect agreement among counsel.46
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, in
1974, instituted a civil appeals management program in which
opposing counsel in certain types of appeals were directed to
appear for the purpose of discussing the possibility of settlement, the limiting of issues, and other matters which might as43. Id.
44. Id. at 1227-29.
45. Id. at 1239.
46. Leventhal, Appellate Procedures. Design, Patchwork, and Managed
Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 432, 445 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

Leventhal].
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sist in disposition.47 The appellant was required to file a preargument "statement," as well as to certify that arrangements
had been made with the court reporter for payment for transcripts (a precaution intended to eliminate frivolous appeals).
If a pecuniary solution appeared feasible, then a case would be
scheduled for conference. These informal conferences tended
to encourage settlements or agreements to submit the case on
stated facts, and both limited and clarified issues. In matrimonial cases, the attorneys were also directed to bring their respective clients to the conference. New York found that the
investment of an appellate judge's time in conducting pre-argument conferences was more than offset by the appellate
caseload reduction caused by withdrawn appeals and settlements. The statistics are extremely impressive: one judge conferenced 468 appeals, 50% of which either settled or were
withdrawn; another judge conferenced 1,016 cases and disposed
of 43%; and a third judge handled 935 cases, disposing of 47%.48
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in 1976, began regular use of
pre-argument settlement conferences for civil appeals. 49 During
that year, such conferences were held in 535 cases. Conference
procedures can have the positive effect of streamlining the predecision phase of the appellate process. After attorneys file preargument statements, cases are randomly assigned to a "reviewing judge." While the settlement conference is in progress,
preparation of the record is suspended, and if no settlement is
achieved, the pre-argument judge enters orders pertaining to
the filing of the record and briefs. Most of the Colorado judges
support the conferences and note that higher dismissal rates
under the pre-argument settlement conference system reflect an
50
increase in the number of settlements.
Reduce Oral Arguments
One appellate court jurist has charged that
[iin the United States, oral argument at the appellate level has
fallen into disrepute. A growing number of appellate courts either
limit oral argument or dispense with it entirely. This low opinion of
oral argument is attributable to two factors: First, the quality of appellate advocacy is generally poor because rigid time limitations allow little opportunity for its development, and second, the present
47. Birnbaum &Ellman, Pre-Argument Settlement Process in an Intermediate Appellate Court: The Second Department Experience, 43
LYN L. REV. 31, 33-46 (1976).

BROOK-

48. Id.
49. Martin & Prescott, The Problem of Delay in the Colorado Court of
Appeals, 58 DEN. L. J. 1, 12-13 (1980).
50. Id.
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superfluheavy reliance upon
51 written briefs makes oral arguments
ous in most cases.
Although numerous legal commentators and some judges
consider oral argument in every case both indispensible and
perhaps an end in itself, others argue that there are only two
instances where oral argument is necessary: (1) where a judge
of the reviewing court requests it, or (2) where an attorney demonstrates that his brief cannot adequately cover his position.
But why should not the written briefs suffice? The briefs frame
the issues, they should exhaustively and persuasively discuss
those issues, and they should be presented in a form that can be
scrutinized judicially.
Perhaps the real solution lies in selectivity. If oral argument
becomes a matter of judicial discretion, rather than of right,
courts will be able to resolve doubts about the sufficiency of a
brief by directing the litigants to appear for oral argument. On
every issue where a judge has questions, the opportunity for
face-to-face, verbal exchange clearly should be available. The
court will thus enjoy the opportunity to explore all aspects of an
ambiguities in the facts, and clarify quesargument, examine
52
tioned theories.
To justify elimination of oral argument, judges must be thoroughly conversant with their calendar and the cases for which
they are responsible. If any judge is not, a three-man court may
be dominated by the judge assigned to write the opinion. This
situation cannot be eliminated through oral argument which, inevitably, is more scanty than a written brief. Perhaps the real
answer is to cut down the reviewing court's workload to afford
an opportunity for conscientious judges to devote their primary
efforts to the more complex appeals that merit in-depth consideration. Such a procedure has been suggested by Jack Leavitt,
53
He
former consultant to the California Judicial Council.
writes:
Having litigants mail in briefs and distantly await a mailed-out
decision, without ever personally confronting their adversaries or
their judges, does seem to be robotizing justice. Admittedly, the
further we remove our judges from the people and events which
constitute a lawsuit, the more doubtful we become that the law has
relevance to human problems. Yet we must remember that the
parties have already had their traditional chance to look a judge
(and, on request, a jury) in the eye and plead their case with all the
personality and psychic factors available to enhance their facts.
That showmanship-a vital part of all litigation in the earlier
51. Jacobson, The Arizona Appellate Project: An Experiment in Simpli-

fied Appeals, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 480, 484 (1976).
52. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 18-19.
53. Id. at 20-21.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:1

phases-must recede on an appeal, if only because the reviewing
court's work has become otherwise unmanageable. However therapeutic oral argument may be, the time it demands from the court
outweighs the benefits it produces. Public displays of attention unfortunately must yield to the more 54productive work of reaching a
sound decision in a timely manner.
Reduce Length and Publicationof Opinions
Statistics reflect the well-founded concerns created by the
deluge of published opinions. From 1790 to 1840, 50,000 decisions
were reported in the United States. During the next fifty years
there were 450,000, and 1,250,000 in the fifty years ending in 1940.
And in the twenty years from 1940 to 1960 between 600,000 and
700,000 more opinions were added to the shelves. 5 5 The Court of
Appeal, Criminal Division, in England in 1970 heard some 8,500
criminal appeals, which figure exceeded the volume of civil and
criminal caseloads of the United States Courts of Appeals for
that year. Yet of that number, only 15% of the opinions were
56
published.
Professor Chanin has compared the special screening procedures of the federal circuits with those of a few state reviewing courts which have adopted rules for limiting opinion writing
or opinion publication. She argues that states should first "enact more specific laws regarding writing and publication of the
opinions," and, wherever possible within a constitutional framework, those states "should consider and adopt restrictive plans
of writing and publication similar to those adopted by most of
'57
the federal appellate courts.
She concludes that: "[A] well-defined plan limiting publication of opinions could reduce the present chaotic volume of published decisions to a cohesive body of law and could reduce the
' 58
burden of the unlimited proliferation of decisions.
Certainly an inherent quality of older opinions is their brev59
ity, while the average opinions today are distressingly lengthy.
54. Id. at 21-22.
55. Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publicationof Opinions in Federal.and State Appellate Courts, 67 L. LIBR. J. 362 (1974).

56. Id. at 363.
57. Id. at 375.
58. Id.

59. A study of 5,900 opinions over a 100-year period revealed that state
supreme courts are writing longer and more elaborate opinions, are citing
more and more cases and law reviews, are filing more dissents and separate
concurrences, and appear to cling to 19th-century style, departing from it as
little as they can and only when they must. .Friedman, Kagan, Cartwright &
Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33
L. REV. 773 (1981).

STAN.
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In the first volume of the California Reports, the average length
of the first ten opinions is 2-1/2 pages, while in a single volume
of California 2d, the first ten opinions average 6-1/2 pages. Moving up to a random selection of California 3d, an equal number
of opinions leap-frogged to about 12-1/2 pages in length. The
opinions of the California Courts of Appeal have kept a similar
pace. As one California appellate judge put it:
If carried to its logical conclusion, given our propensity to spew out
endless legal essays on every imaginable esoteric subject, opinions
will soon be hundreds of pages in length and the law will be lost in
a welter of words. Already legal 60
research has become a mini
nightmare. The future bodes chaos.
In Iowa in recent years, the length of judicial opinions has
doubled. The Iowa Reports reflected-after a random analysisthat Iowa Supreme Court opinions averaged from 1.8 pages in
length during 1877-78 to 4.5 pages in 1951. Since 1966, the length
61
of opinions increased, on an average, to about 9.5 pages.
Although a change in the prolixity of opinion writing is feasible, it will not be an easy row to hoe. The reasons for long
opinions are deep-seated in an occupational hazard endemic to
reviewing court judges:
Short opinions are possible but devastating to one's reputation as a
legal scholar. A short opinion's author is looked upon as a judicial
eccentric. Nevertheless, opinions are useless unless they will be
read and can be understood. Many of our current elephantine offerings are simply not read because of their size and, if read, are so
prolix they are impossible to understand. Thus, the62unduly long
opinion not only loses its audience, it loses its focus.
The conclusion seems inescapable that full-blown written
opinions in routine cases should be abandoned. Judge Harold
Leventhal of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has observed that: "[1]ess argument and opinion time for the
cases that warrant less yields more time for the hard cases that
require more." 63 He reminds us that in England, reasons for an
appellate court's rulings are given in open court and that only
opinions of general legal significance are published. A mere 1015% of criminal appeals are reported, and even those are sub60. Gardner, Toward Shorter Opinions, 55 CAL. ST.B.J. 240 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gardner]. For a 111-page opinion in a state appellate court,
see Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965). And for a federal trial court opinion of 171 pages, the reader is directed to Vuyanich v.

Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224 (1980). For a good "law review article" of 72 pages, turn to Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric
Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (1979).

61. Beatty, Decision-Making on the Iowa Supreme Court-1965-1969, 19
L. REV. 342, 343 (1970).

DRAKE

62. Gardner, supra note 60, at 244.
63. Leventhal, supra note 46, at 435.
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stantially edited so that only significant issues are actually
published.64
The D.C. Circuit rules have permitted judgments without
published opinions since 1968 and these account for over half of
that court's dispositions. 6 5 Judge Leventhal enthusiastically endorses the use of summary dispositions:
They expedite the process and help delay the swelling of law libraries. Some brief indication of reasons can be retained, enough to
serve the appearance of justice and the reality of consideration.
Writing takes more time than reading. Indeed, opinions are estimated to account for approximately 48 per cent of the case time
and 30 per cent of the total time of a federal appellate court. It
bears repetition that summary dispositions, preferably with some
citation or indication of reasons, for the bulk of cases means that
opinion time can be devoted to
66 the cases that really require extended reflection and analysis.
In the New York Court of Appeals, if a case is determined to
have very little precedential value, a short memorandum opinion is filed, with few, if any, citations. If the disposition may significantly affect those other than the parties to the case, the
decision may be handed down in a per curiam opinion, not of
extended length, but at least with a few citations included. The
fully developed and traditional opinion, however, is reserved for
67
cases involving new law or new application to old principles.
One judge of that court has said that he strives to "use citations
precisely but sparsely," and leaves it to "law reviews and text
writers to collect the authorities. ' 68 He does not see the function of an opinion as a crutch for research.
Since an intermediate reviewing court does not have the
final legal word in a jurisdiction, the expeditious disposition of
cases should be its emphasis. Although a court's opinion should
set forth its reasoning, it should be done briefly. Like Illinois,
the State of Oregon has an appellate public defender who handies 90% of all criminal appeals. 69 Many of those appeals have
little merit and possess no precedential value. Many of the Oregon appeals, however, are decided after oral argument by a brief
oral statement recited from the bench. All that appears in the
case reports is "affirmed from the bench. ' 70 As one judge of the
Oregon intermediate reviewing court succinctly put it: "Our job
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 439 n. 29.
Id.
Id. at 441 (footnote omitted).
See Jones, Cogitationson Appellate Decision-Making,52 N. Y. ST.B.

J. 216 (1980).

68. Id. at 216.
69. Schwab, Court Modernization, 50

70. Id. at 10.

Wis. B. BuLL.9, 10 (1977).
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The state constitution in California requires that opinions of
the courts of appeal be written, stating the reasons for the disposition, but it does not specifically require that all opinions are to
be published.7 2 The rules of court in California require publication of opinions only in cases where new rules of law are established, where accepted or existing rules of law are modified,
where the cases deal with a question of continuing public interest, or where they openly criticize existing law.7 3 A majority of
the deciding panel determines whether a specific opinion will be
published or not. Indeed, only a small percentage are approved
for publication. In 1976, only 15.7% of the majority opinions
were published throughout all five districts, and the remainder
were nonpublished opinions that may not be cited as precedent. 74 In an intriguing analysis, Professor Noonan posits
whether we need appellate opinions at all. He says: "Suppose
all we had were the facts of the case and the decision, or the
71. Id. at 11. One observer of the appellate scene suggests that litigants
and their attorneys should have more control over the reviewing process.
Since they participate at the trial level in framing pleadings, findings of fact,
conclusions of law, judgments, orders, etc., they should have a similar hand
in the reviewing procedures. He states:
Why then-when the same amount of money, property or punishment
is at issue as it was earlier in the litigation--do we keep the parties from
sharing in the appellate proceedings except as recognized advocates?
...[M] ost cases should receive only memorandum opinions which list
the points raised and note in whose favor the issues were resolved.
Speed will be the key virtue. For impatient parties who prefer an even
speedier decision, the appellate court should accept a waiver of written
opinion in exchange for an accelerated place on the calendar .... For
those parties who rate content as more important than speed, a full
written opinion would be served when all the litigants requested it in
their briefs.
Leavitt, supra note 6, at 23-24. Leavitt further suggests that
[t] he logistics of the decision making process should also be shifted to
the litigant's typewriters. Just as trial lawyers submit proposed instructions to the judge for delivery to the jury, appellate attorneys
should be deemed capable of submitting appropriate statements for a
memorandum opinion or, in the event of a reversal or modification, specific directions for the trial judge to follow. Every brief should be required to have a section devoted to the litigant's recommended sample
opinion, which the court could use as it saw fit-hopefully as a timesaving aid, at worst as a warning of what to avoid in a judicious
presentation.
Id. at 25. This is an intriguing proposal-worthy of further thought and, perhaps, pragmatic experimentation.
72. CAL.CONST. art. VI, § 14.
73. CAL.CT. R. 976(b), 976(c).
74. Wold, Going Through the Motions: The Monotony of Appellate Court
Decision-Making, 62 JUDICATURE 58, 63 (1978). For a different view, critical

of memorandum, unpublished opinions-specifically under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23-see Record, Remediesfor Backlog in the Appellate
Court of Illinois, 62 ILL. B.J. 82 (1973).
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facts, the arguments and the decision. Would there be any
loss?"

75

THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE

Progress Through Docketing

Now let us focus on the Appellate Court of Illinois. To pick a
single division, the court for the Fourth District in 1964 had three
judges. During that year, exactly 89 cases were filed, an average
of 30 cases per judge. In 1980, with five judges (another elected
judge having been authorized and another assigned full-time), a
total of 868 cases were fied-an average of 173.6 cases per judge.
Similar substantial increases in case filings were experienced in
other districts of Illinois. 76 The First District in Cook County
saw 765 appeals filed in77 1964 and experienced an explosion of
6,479 cases filed in 1980.

It became clear during the 1970's that appellate court dispositions were not keeping pace with the rapid increase in workload. The loss of currency and the delays in finality became
startling. 78 In 1977, following recommendations of an Illinois
Supreme Court committee on appellate court administration,
new management practices to expedite appeals were implemented in the appellate court for the Fourth District. The sucof
cess of this pilot experience promoted, in 1979, the adoption
79
the new practices by the entire Appellate Court of Illinois.

The system has become known as "Docketing Procedures."
Essentially, the system works in the following manner. First, as
soon as a notice of appeal is fied in the trial court clerk's office, a
copy is mailed to the appellate court clerk. Within two weeks of
the notice of appeal, the appellant is required to file with the
appellate court a "docketing statement." This document furnishes such significant data as the names of the parties, counsel
on appeal, trial counsel, the trial judge, the court reporters, the
nature of the case, a brief description of the case, and a certificate by counsel for appellant that he has requested the record
and report of proceedings to be prepared. A docketing order is
75. Noonan, Book Review, 63 CAL. L. REV. 824, 825-26 (1975).
76. See ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS
COURTS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS (1964-1980).
77. Id. Regarding the caseload in 1968 of the Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, see Address by Hon. R. English, Crisis in Civil Appeals, 50
CHI. B. REC. 231 (1969).
78. Martin & Prescott, VOLUME AND DELAY IN THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE
COURT, FIRST DISTRICT-A STAFF STUDY, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS (1980).

79. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 303 (1981).
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then prepared by the appellate court clerk and signed by the
presiding judge. This order sets forth a complete timetable for
the appeal from the date the notice of appeal was filed to the
time when a decision may be anticipated. The various fixed
dates are computed on the basis of the appropriate supreme
court rules and direct when various pleadings and documents
are to be filed: the report of proceedings in the trial court; the
record; the appellant's brief; the appellee's brief; appellant's reply brief; the month when oral argument can be expected to be
scheduled; and, finally, the order states that within 60 days of
oral argument a decision may be expected. There is also a caveat on the docketing order which invites emphasis. This caveat cautions all counsel to adhere to the timetable, urges that
all requests for extension of time be made to the appellate court,
and advises that such motions for extension are notfavored and
only in the most extreme and comwill be allowed by the 8court
0
pelling circumstances.
Prior to the new docketing procedures, the trial court normally had control up to the time that the record on appeal was
actually filed in the appellate court. The new rules place such
control squarely with the appellate court. Although the notice
of appeal is still filed in the trial court, the minute that the copy
of that notice is received by the appellate court clerk, the case is
docketed in the appellate court and that tribunal takes immediate control of the case. Once a docketing order has been entered
by the appellate court, that tribunal takes direct management of
the case and controls the flow of any action in that appeal thereafter.8 1 The experience has been particularly encouraging. For
example, under prior methods, there was an average timelag of
approximately 23 months between the fling of the notice of appeal and the disposition of the case. The average time under the
to approximately 8.5 to 9
new docketing procedure has dropped
82
months in the Fourth District.
80. Id.
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, §§ 309, 323 (1981).

82. Statewide, the statistics are similarly impressive. Using the time

lapse of one year or less between filing and disposition as a standard, all

districts of the Appellate Court of Illinois finalized 2,554 such cases in 1977

under old procedures, and 4,408 cases in 1980 under the new docketing practice. That was a 72.6% increase in expedited productivity. During those
same years, the First District increased its disposition from 943 cases to
1,507 cases, amounting to a 60% increase. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

(1980).
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The Need for More Innovations
United States Circuit Court Judge John C. Godbold writes:
"Courts have tended to be defensive about giving cases variable
appellate treatment, but gradually it is sinking into the judicial
consciousness that the reassessments forced by necessity have
improved the system. '83 Yet as successful as the docketing procedure has proved to be in the expedition of the Illinois appellate caseload, more innovations will be necessary if the
reviewing court is to keep its head above water and maintain
relative currency. The statistics over the past few years have
demonstrated that the increase in volume is continuing and it is
not likely that appellate case filings will decrease.M
Traditionally, the path of an appeal traverses four primary
routes: the record, the briefs, oral argument, and the decision.
Each of these stages of the appellate process are fertile areas for
modification, innovation, and restructuring.
The Record
Record preparation is frequently an expensive portion of an
appeal and from a procedural standpoint it can consume the
most time, delaying an appeal inordinately. Although the compilation of the common law record or case fie in the trial court
may be slow, it is more commonly the transcription of the court
reporter's trial record that frustrates the timely filing of the report of proceedings. In Illinois, under the current docketing procedures, the potential exists for reducing delays in transcript
preparation if the filing deadlines on the docketing order are
firmly adhered to, with sanctions imposed for failure to comply.
However, the pragmatic problems of doing this are great when a
court reporter is constantly being used in the courtroom with
little opportunity to prepare transcripts. The solution to this dilemma lies in equalizing the workload among all reporters
within a given jurisdiction.
There are a tremendous number of cases where a complete
transcript from the trial court is not required for full consideration of the issues involved in the appeal. There are numerous
appellate cases where only a brief record is needed for full consideration of the case. Obviously, where a case is disposed of on
the pleadings or by way of summary judgment, the record is normally a very short one. In other cases, only a small amount of
83. Goldbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure: Better Use of
Available Facilities,66 A.B.A.J. 863, 865 (1980).
84.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

COURTS TO THIE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS (1980).

OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS
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testimony is taken and no delay in the preparation of the transcript is justified. There are also cases in which only a certain
portion of the trial proceedings need be transcribed as only that
portion deals with the one or two issues presented on appeal. It
is sometimes possible to encourage stipulated statements by the
parties in lieu of a formal, verbatim transcript. This could be
accomplished by rule of court, staff screening and selection, and
accelerated handling.
Briefs
At the next stage, it has been this writer's experience that
on the whole most briefs are simply too long and go far beyond
what is necessary to present the facts, issues, and legal arguments required for the appeal.85 If the rule says that 75 printed
pages or 100 typewritten pages shall be the maximum, 86 it frequently becomes the minimum. In most cases, a 40 or 50 page
brief will be more than adequate. Moreover, if the briefs are
shortened, is it not also logical to shorten the filing period? Instead of 35-35-14 days for appellant's brief, appellee's brief, and
appellant's reply brief,87 could we not experiment with 21-21-7?
In addition to shortening the length of briefs and their fMling periods, the format or content of briefs may well be simplifiedparticularly in those cases that merely apply the particular facts
in the case to well-settled law. In those more simplified or easily-recognized appeals, the form of the briefs could very well be
limited to a simple statement of the issues, a list of the authorities relied on, and the argument of appellate counsel.
Oral Argument
Oral argument must be considered in light of the type of
case on appeal. Where an appeal is relatively complex or involves novel questions or issues with far-reaching impact, then
such cases should be completely and fully briefed. If the judges
of the reviewing court perceive no benefit to be derived from
oral argument, then the court should be free to dispense with
85. As Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
said:
Long briefs are absolutely destructive to a lawyer's case. While charging by the pound for briefs may justify huge bills to clients, the short
brief requires more work and is more persuasive. Judges are lazy!
Judges are lazy (in case you missed it the first time)! They do not enjoy
reading briefs, and when they are required to read 600 pages a week,
they have inevitably developed techniques for skimming. A judge will
usually read all of a 15-page brief and about 15 pages of a 100-page brief.
Juis DR., March 1977, at 33, 34.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 341 (1981).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 343 (1981).
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oral argument and dispose of the case on its merits through the
briefs. If an appeal is adequately and properly briefed, oral argument merely affords an opportunity for an oral reiteration of
what is already in the written briefs.
However, there are other cases where oral argument should
indeed be encouraged. Those cases which merely require the
application of well-settled law to common facts are the types of
cases where limited briefing is appropriate and where short oral
argument is likely to facilitate and expedite the appeal. This is
so particularly in those cases where brief dispositive orders or
short memorandum opinions are appropriate, or where a court
may render its disposition orally from the bench immediately
subsequent to oral argument.
Decision
Traditionally, parties to an appeal will wait for months (and
even years) to find out whether they won or lost. To most litigants it is probably immaterial as to why they were successful
or not-they simply want to know the bottom line, win or lose.
In the decided majority of cases that are appealed of right, a
brief dispositive order or short memorandum opinion (or even
an oral decision from the bench followed by a short order) is
really all that is warranted. We have already noted the inundation of written and printed opinions on the shelves. Most of it
can be measured by the ton and is of relatively little benefit to
legal knowledge. Its compilation, and the lead time required for
its rendition, does not significantly add to the sum of our legal
learning. Most of those learned opinions could be a one-page
order or a 2-3 page unpublished memorandum opinion.
Or why not give the litigants a choice? The parties could
(1) waive a written opinion in return for a rapid ruling by a short
memorandum disposition, or (2) suffer the delay if they want to
wait for a full-blown written opinion with an in-depth analysis of
the issues and reasoning for the decision. If the parties cannot
agree, shuttle the case to the "slow track." 88
88. The Supreme Court of Illinois recently adopted a new Rule 311
which provides for the accelerated docket:
Any time after filing the docketed statement in the Appellate Court, the
parties may agree to have their case placed on an accelerated docket.
The agreement shall be in the form of a motion signed by an attorney
for each party and may provide for submission of an agreed statement
of facts in lieu of a record, and memoranda in lieu of formal briefs. The
court may then enter an order setting forth an expedited schedule for
the disposition of the appeal.
ILL. REV.STAT. ch. § 110A, § 311 (1981). A novel suggestion that should not
be cavalierly rejected out of hand is for the court to require that the litigants' attorneys furnish a sample opinion as they would write it in their
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Screening, Case Management and Use of Staff
It is apparent that the necessary means for expediting appellate determination are screening, extensive use of central
staff and tight case management. Screening by staff attorneys
and law clerks at all stages of the appellate process, coupled
with tight control by the court of its own order and schedule for
the processing of the appeal, can assure that routine appeals are
kept on track and disposed of as they should be. Perhaps Professor Meador's goal of 127 days to process the appeal 89 will not
be met in every instance, but in the properly screened and expedited run-of-the-mill appeal, it is entirely possible.
CONCLUSION

All intermediate reviewing courts have become high volume
tribunals. The realities of increased population in a highly complex society would indicate that the avalanche of appeals will
not be dissipated. It will be the procedural innovations devised
and tailored by appellate courts that will determine whether or
not we keep our judicial heads above the high watermark.
I have had, upon earlier occasion, the opportunity to suggest
"that many of the current reviewing methods of traditional common law America are not only inadequate, but have become antiquated and anachronistic. At the very least, they have not kept
pace with our transition over the past 60 years from horsepower
to space shuttles, from scrivener-clerks to computers." 90 Unless
we come to hard grips with the pragmatic problems of processing appellate cases and devise ways to greatly expedite appeals,
the future of our court will simply be relegated to manhandling
backlogs instead of resolving legal issues.
Attorneys and judges alike-and all court administrative
and research staff personnel-must invent novel procedural
tools and experiment with those already tried in other jurisdictions. By trial and error, the best of all procedures from other
courts can be adopted. Pride of authorship must have no part to
play and any effective procedure from one jurisdiction can be
modified and altered to other appellate systems if it will further
expedite appellate review. As Woodrow Wilson once said, "But
why should we not use such parts of foreign contrivances as we
want if they may be in any way serviceable? We are in no dancase and attach it to their briefs. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 25. An experiment of this nature might well prove fruitful.
89. Meador, Through the Appellate Court in 127 Days, 20 JUDGES' J. 59
(1981).
90. Mills, The Illinois Appellate Court. A Chronicle and Breviary of In-

termediate Review, 3 S. ILL. U. L. J. 373, 392 (1981).
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ger of using them in a foreign way. We borrowed rice, but we do
not eat it with chopsticks."
I have suggested some procedures that have been found to
be effective elsewhere and which should be tried in my tribunal's arena, with proper tailoring to our own fabric. I hope my
colleagues and the members of our bar will critically and constructively examine those suggestions-implementing those
which are meritorious and abandoning those which will not effectively further the mandate of the Illinois Constitution "for expeditious and inexpensive appeals." 91

91. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (1970).

